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Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) relates the concepts of nihilism and responsibility to each other. Already in 
1919 he suggests that responsibility is the adequate way of relating to nihilism. At the time he is not 
very clear on what this means. By retracing his treatment of nihilism this paper clarifies it, and it will 
also show that the way he is putting the two concepts together is relevant for contemporary 
discussions of responsibility. The aim of this paper is to expose an underlying historical connection 
between the two concepts whereby the concept of responsibility is elaborated as a response to the 
concept of nihilism. I shall show an affinity between these concepts which is also a conceptual 
constellation of relevance for today, although so far it had been drawn on only infrequently. 
 
The concept of nihilism was not unknown to Weimar Germany’s intellectuals, as it had a tradition in 
Germany and had been used to connote Russian revolutionaries. Furthermore, it had been promoted 
Context 
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by Nietzsche. For these reasons the concept was readily available for inclusion into discourses on 
culture and society. 
Jaspers talks about nihilism in the context of contemporary criticism made after the merging of the 
German states to one empire in 1871 and the economic boom that followed it. The discussion was 
concerned with urbanization, industrialization and secularization. The topics of contemporary 
criticism were the depletion of culture through atomization, mechanization and the dissolution of 
values. Nietzsche, who is central for this discussion, calls it a cultural degeneration and provides it an 
effective expression through his concept of ‘European nihilism’. During WWI Thomas Mann writes 
extensively in this critical tradition. Mann makes a distinction between the German culture which is 
anchored in values and the French civilization which he regards as being without a future. For him 
the criticism of civilization is a criticism of nihilism. 
This takes us to the widely spread critiques of civilization in Germany of the 1920s and 1930s. To 
these critics count thinkers of various kinds. Max Weber belongs to this group although he died 
already in 1920. His view on rationalization and bureaucracy that is restricting our lives exerted a 
strong influence on it. The Frankfurt School of Marxist thinkers criticized modern technology and 
analyzed phenomena of mass culture as its logical outcome. The founder and leader of the Pan-
European movement Richard Coudenhove-Calergi, who pleaded for technical development but 
argued for the need to compliment it with a strong ethics, was another important voice at the time. 
An important step was taken when nihilism was being seen as the force behind technology, 
degeneration and other objectionable aspects of culture. Thereupon it was an obvious move to 
connect this view with Nietzsche and to start using the concept of ‘European nihilism’. These 
civilization critiques regard neither technology nor machines nor the idea of progress as the 
fundamental problem; rather, it is nihilism that is designated as being the contemporary master and 
the cause for degeneration. Nihilism was being considered by them as a European phenomenon that 
spread everywhere. Nihilism was being identified as underlying the positivism of the 19th century, 
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the denial of moral and inner values, the making of everything permitted and the removal of God 
from man.i
The critique of civilization was also a common theme among the young group of conservative 
intellectuals that opposed Enlightenment ideas and the democracy of the Republic, and which 
happily read the pleading by Hugo von Hofmannsthal for a conservative revolution. During the final 
years of the Weimar Republic they acknowledged the Nazis as allies in the battle against liberal and 
socialist ideologists. They considered the French and Russian revolutions, as well as the 
Enlightenment and the idea of progress, as phases in the development of nihilism.
  
ii
They were determined to bring the expanding nihilism to an end. However, some of these 
conservatives became strong critics of Nazism, which they proclaimed to be nihilistic itself. A good 
illustration of this is Hermann Rauschning, who for a while was a member of the Nazi-party and an 
official in Danzig. After the Nazis had risen to power he became bit by bit more critical of the regime. 
He lost his work, was being harassed by Nazi adherents and fled subsequently with his family to the 
USA. During the 1930s and the 1940s he wrote books on the Nazis’ misdeeds and criticized them in 
lively terms for their lack of respect for traditional and Christian values. In 1938 he coined the epithet 
“the revolution of nihilism” in order to characterize in what way the Nazis were changing the 
society.
  
iii
 
 
Jaspers was professor in Heidelberg from 1921 onwards. In the Weimar Republic he was not a clear-
cut defender of its democracy. But this changed with the rise of Hitler. Not wanting to adhere to 
National Socialism he had to leave his professorship in 1937 and he lived in internal exile throughout 
the war. After 1945 he contributed extensively to the discussion on civic morality and the evolving 
Nihilism as an anthropological prerequisite 
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German democracy. His advocacy of existential philosophy evolves from reading Kierkegaard and 
reconstructing Kantian philosophy.  
Some of his philosophy's claims are anthropological. He uses the concept of nihilism to define an 
anthropological feature of man. He is very much aware of Nietzsche’s historical definition that 
emphasizes nihilism as a Christian phenomenon, as Christianity separated this world from the other 
world, leaving man with promises that never were being fulfilled.iv
“Border situations” refer to the fact that each human being lives in an ongoing process of border 
crossing, in a movement between areas of rest and dissolution. For Jaspers this constitutes a basic 
given on both the individual and the societal level. The dissolution and the crossing of borders is the 
result of our knowledge of other ways of living. Both individual lives and societies are involved in a 
ceaseless process of changes and new portrayals or interpretations of existence. Jaspers sets out 
from this description in order to describe worldviews. They have the common aim of helping man to 
escape the worries, the suffering and the pain that issues from the changes. Jaspers also posits the 
development of urgent needs for dissolution that are nihilistic. Nihilism is, thus, interpreted by him as 
an essential force (he characterizes it also as an idea or a principle).
 By defining nihilism in another 
way he can set out for another focus. His anthropological definition of nihilism is already a main point 
in the book Psychology of Worldviews (Psychologie der Weltanschauungen) which was published in 
1919. This is where he presents his thesis of the ”border situations” (‘Grenzsituationen’) of life, the 
idea he is most remembered for.  
v
In Jaspers’ anthropology there is a barrier within man against nihilism. Thanks to this there are very 
few who fully affirm nihilism. The German word being used is “Feste”, which denotes that which 
holds up something, e.g. the stars on the firmament, it also signifies a fortress or a stronghold. It can 
be translated as a hilt, an attachment or simply a protection. Something exists within man that does 
not accept life to be a nothing. Jaspers describes it in terms of the last powers to be found of the 
 This means, that nihilism is a 
part of life itself, with its different situations and contexts.  
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human soul. This hilt may occur as mere fragments, that are capable of keeping the nihilist alive, but 
it may also occur as a hardware equipment (an integral part of a person’s character or what do you 
mean by that? – it sounds to me like you’re talking about a computer and not human beings), or fully 
embrace the individual life.vi
Man has to defend himself against different kinds of nihilism. Jaspers identifies these forms of 
nihilism. One kind consists in the belief in another world, which is generated when the present life 
seems meaningless because values and meaning are placed in the life after death. Nihilism also 
appears among individuals who do not share this belief, provided that a self-denying attitude is 
gaining strength and given importance. The average nihilist tries to find fulcrums, by looking for 
something which he perceives as being authentic. This can be music, art or a worldview. 
Alternatively, it can be sensual pleasures or the aiming for higher tasks.  
 
Nihilism is according to Jaspers antagonistic to what he calls ”das Gehäuse”, which is the word for a 
capsule or cover. This is where we seek shelter when we no longer can stand the questioning of 
every form of existence.  When everything is relative, we can fall back on a power within ourselves 
which helps us to identify an authentic worldview or a ranking of values that appears to be final. This 
is where man can find peace, but it is also where he can find starting points for taking action. An 
inner longing for sustainable truths can grow, when everything is changing and nihilism becomes 
unbearable. Jaspers describes this process as an encapsulation. The one who is within a capsule has 
shut out the border crossing. He has built himself a convenient and secure existence for himself, but 
the price paid for it is a frozen attitude against the world, where the worlòdviews have taken over.vii
Jaspers introduces nihilism in the later parts of Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (The Psychology 
of the Worldviews). He is in these parts inspired by Hegel and uses some citations from The 
Phenomenology of the Spirit. Hegel’s description of the decomposition of the self-consciousness is 
put forward in order to illustrate a specific kind of nihilism, in which learning and education are not 
incorporated into the self-consciousness, but are used as mere tools. This marks a poor and 
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delimited self-consciousness. In support of it he cites a few lines from Hegel on the vain ego (((that 
lives by showing itself in all that it can manage, but abides even in its soul. (290-95)))) (This part of 
the sentence is incomprehensible – either rephrase or delete it). Jaspers alludes to Hegel’s 
description of the development of the self-consciousness when he argues that nihilism is inevitable 
from a psychological perspective: those who want to achieve a more developed self-consciousness 
cannot avoid nihilism. Nihilism is part of an authentic life.viii
Psychologie der Weltanschauungen is an academic dissertation of more than five hundred pages. It is 
systematically structured, written in a prose that oscillates between being picturesque and vivid, and 
presenting dry statements of fact. The issue is extensive.  Jaspers ambition is to clarify the powers of 
the soul, without venturing into the worldviews that we meet in life. The distance to life outside the 
university library may at times feel uncomfortably large. However, he will eventually bring up 
nihilism writing in a different genre, a genre frequently utilized by German university professors, 
whereby they deliver lectures, meditations and polemics in a smaller format which is aimed at a 
wider audience.  
 
Jaspers discusses the expansion of nihilism in a number of minor pieces during subsequent decades. 
The first example is ‘Die geistige Situation’ from 1931. In it the exposition of the contemporary 
culture is quite general. When describing contemporary society, Jaspers often portrays historical 
changes in general terms – for instance, he makes the observation that people have been uprooted 
and have begun to invest more hope in earthly existence than in the dream of an afterlife. The 
consequences of these changes are crucial to the contemporary worldview: people feel imprisoned 
in a transitory universe, which nourishes a sense of powerlessness. They are beset by the awareness 
that everything perishes, by constant questioning and by an endless whirlwind of self-deception.ix In 
the spirit of Weber, Jaspers also takes to a more sociological approach. Whereas Weber spoke of the 
disenchantment (in German Entzauberung) of the world, Jaspers uses the term de-deification 
(Entgötterung) to describe the legacy of Protestantism and scientific thought. The result of which has 
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been the rationalisation and mechanisation of production and organisation, as well as the triumph of 
methodical thinking. Jaspers emphasises that technology is extending its tentacles to the entire 
world. It squeezes its way into and schematises everyday life, making human interaction impersonal.x 
He characterises the modern world as the epoch of the machine that reduces individuals to cogs. 
Nations and cities, factories and shops, are bureaucratic machines that cannot see beyond the 
present. As a consequence people lose their sense for the past and the future. The only thing that 
matters to them is their ability to operate the machine in the present moment.xi
 
  
In 1948, Jaspers writes that World War II has carried nihilism to its logical conclusion. He provides a 
basic definition of it that coincides with the one used in the 19th century. Nihilists have only 
temporary dogmas since they question and relativize everything. To them, there is no truth and all is 
permitted. Nihilists are driven by vitality and the lust for power.
Jaspers on Nazism and WWII 
xii
Thus, Jaspers identifies the fundamental features of nihilism and relates them to fanaticism (which 
clearly hints at Nazism) and disrespect for human life (highlighted by WWII), criticising a society in 
which the machine has taken over and people have resigned themselves to serving it (which repeats 
the civilisation critique). Nor can modern science escape his criticism. On the contrary, Jaspers 
regards science and faith in progress as the main threats to the post-war world.
 The result was Nazism and the 
disaster of war. 
xiii
If 19th century society is said to be dominated by nihilism, the logical question becomes how to 
relate to this. One obvious insight is that then much also became possible which was not possible 
before, since an increasingly broad and profound nihilism neglected all values  and authorities. All 
loyalties might be reconsidered, allowing for a fresh start. Martin Heidegger pointed in this context 
without hesitation to Nietzsche's "will to power". It is apparently tempting to argue for decisionistic 
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ideas, where initiative and power is owned by those that act. "In the beginning was the act" as 
Goethe’s Faust said, and Thomas Mann later repeated in Dr. Faustus. 
 
Jaspers responds differently when he addresses the possibility of man to be in himself and to develop 
his own personal abilities. In ’Der Philosophische Glaube’ he speaks of man's essential being, which is 
about living with the border situation. The meaning of life is to see them as a call to freedom and to 
man's transcendence, the ability to go beyond himself in order to become something enhanced. 
Jaspers turns to existential philosophy in order to find an alternative to contemporary technological 
thinking. The possibility of freedom that it points out offers people no peace; existential philosophy is 
not supported by the great heroes, it lacks the prophets and demagogues, it is a struggle that has no 
front. The change occurs in the small, in the ordinary everyday life.  
 
For Jaspers, Nazism and the Second World War were large and fundamental issues. He often uses the 
two notions responsibility and future to describe alternatives to the rampant nihilism. Responsibility 
is presented as being the best way to cope and live with the basic human situation of boundary 
crossing, as a kind of third way on the one hand beyond the fear of change and and on the other 
hand beyond nihilism. The future is adduced as a viable option leading beyond nihilism: people can 
decide that in the future they will be free.  
Future and responsibility 
 
After the war, he publishes a lecture he gave in 1946 entitled "Europe von Heute". The lecture is 
motivated by a single thought, namely, that nihilism may not take over. The argument in short is that 
the experience of WWII and the threat of a future nuclear war might be an excuse for thinking that 
the end of the world is inevitable. For him, the greatest threat is that people turn to  a nihilistic 
attitude. Therefore, he wants to highlight the opportunities that are now available for Europe. He has 
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in mind nothing less than the possibility of a new world order, in which no culture is ruling over the 
others, in which no world empire is taking over. (38ff) Yet nihilism is simultaneously portrayed as 
being so profoundly interwoven with the European experience that it is unavoidable.  
 
When Jaspers talks about the future the idea of Europe is of importance to him. After World War II it 
was not obvious to think of Europe as a unity. Some European leaders also argued for an united 
Europe. For instance, Winston Churchill made several speeches in which he pleaded for the need of 
the European powers to cooperate and in which he claimed that integration would be the best way 
to avoid future wars on the Continent. Jaspers goes a step further than Churchill when he argues that 
Europe should no longer be characterized as being a mighty colonial power.  
 
Jaspers sees Europe as a cultural entity, which sought to distinguish itself from its neighbors, by 
regarding them as barbarians. He depicts the spiritual principles that gave Europe a deeper meaning 
than being the geographic foothills of the Asian land mass. According to him, the principle during the 
Middle Ages has been Christianity and in the modern era it has been colonialism.xiv
 
  
In his determination of the European culture and its 'spiritual principles', he brings together Hegel's 
conception of the spirit that develops its self-consciousness with Kant’s conception of the theoretical 
principles of reason. Jaspers speaks with Hegel when he points to a European spirit, the European 
traditions and morals that have been developed throughout history. It is expressed by the great 
artists and writers, it is reflected by the culture-bearing towns and monuments. With Hegel, Jaspers 
speaks about the historical experience of which nihilism is an important part and through which a 
more informed self-consciousness can be reached.  
 
He draws on Kant when stating which the European principles are, namely, freedom, historical 
consciousness and science. First comes freedom of thought, which sets the scene for the European 
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spirit, as its highest principle. Like Kant, Jaspers argues for the importance of not lapsing into 
arbitrariness, without having asserted one's own conviction and truth. At the same time we need to 
be aware that the terms and conditions of freedom are tied to an ever-changing history. Jaspers also 
is careful to note that European history is marked by contradictions. Some of them relate to Europe's 
real historical development. There have been periods of order which were interrupted by 
revolutions. Europe has had on the one hand the church as a superior organization and on the other 
hand the state. Catholicism and Protestantism contradicted each other. Further contradictions are of 
a conceptual character. They regard science and faith, or the real world (materialism) and 
transcendence (idealism). The contradictions cannot be avoided; political freedom can at any time 
being disrupted since the preservation of freedom requires limits and rules, the truth is diverse and 
changing, science encounters limits, we will always live with an imperfect freedom and Europe will 
never be perfect.xv
 
 
 
In The Atomic Bomb and the Future of Man (1958) Karl Jaspers elaborates his view of nuclear 
technology as a threat to the world. Thereby he focuses on the consequences of the existence of 
nuclear weapons. He sees the atomic bomb in light of the technological age and the criticism of 
civilisation that he previously advanced. What has changed in comparison with former weapons is 
that the consequences of the use of atomic bombs are extremely dramatic. New war-making 
capabilities, of which the bomb is the quintessential expression, have lent violence an entirely 
different dimension. That which was once a battle of conflicting interests now threatens to annihilate 
the human race.
The threat of nuclear technology 
xvi People have already previously been able to kill themselves and others and even 
to commit genocide. But now technocracy had created a lethal threat to all life on earth.  
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Although the late Jaspers uses the word ‘nihilism’ much more infrequently, he is still conducting the 
same critique of culture and the idea of progress.  Without doubt he considers the atomic bomb as 
the final outcome of nihilism. As a result, according to him, the consideration of political conflicts 
must shift towards analysing the forces that bind all social institutions together. Jaspers argues that 
our ways of thinking need to adapt to the new reality. The limited mindset of a philosopher or a 
public official falls short when existence itself is at stake. Every individual is affected by the nuclear 
threat. A new ethos that proceeds from trans-political motives is needed.xvii
Jaspers alternates between presenting objective facts and engaging in philosophical reasoning. His 
solution is based partially on the Baruch Plan, which was proposed by the U.S. government in 1946 
and eventually led to the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the foundation of the 
IAEA. In accordance with his plan, all stages of atomic energy production (both of uranium deposits 
and of reactors) would have to be placed under the control of an international agency, which would 
have the right to monitor and inspect plants and production processes at any time anywhere in the 
world. Jaspers posits that rational thought has the power to avert the threat. In the spirit of Kant, he 
distinguishes between two ways of thinking: human understanding is responsible for the mechanical 
approach of the technological age which gave birth to the atomic bomb. Reason, which goes beyond 
simple understanding, is a fundamental, independent way of thinking capable of making judicious 
decisions. In Jaspers’ opinion, reason holds the seeds of salvation.xviii
 
 
Jaspers proposes what he refers to as ‘the principles of peace’, which primarily encompass the 
renunciation of violence as a means of resolving conflicts when dealing with the dangers posed by 
the atomic bomb. He envisages a world in which laws and agreements are honoured, all countries 
waive their sovereignty and veto rights in international bodies, voting and majority decisions are 
complied with, news channels of information and public debate are honest and truthful, and human 
rights are broadly respected. In other words, he places his faith in ‘soft’ democratic values.xix But 
Jaspers says that these principles are not enough. The more fundamental challenge for human beings 
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consists in the necessity to ‘change ourselves, our characters, our moral-political wills.’ The ethics he 
suggests is based on trans-political motives and generally on a moral attitude. Everybody must work 
towards such a change by creating peace in their own lives and by passing it on to others.xx A political 
ethics of peaceful communication is needed.xxi Such an ethics requires the courage to accept human 
limitations and to let go of our faith in technological progress.xxii
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